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Recognizing that the object-directed actions of others are governed by goals and
intentions is a crucial component of human interaction. These actions often occur
rapidly and without explanation, yet we learn from and predict the actions of others
with remarkable speed and accuracy, even during the first year of life. This review paper
will serve as a bridge between several disparate literatures that, we suggest, can each
contribute to our understanding of how infants interpret action. Specifically, we provide a
review not just of research on infant goal attribution per se, but also incorporate findings
from studies on the mirror neuron system and infant object cognition. The integration
of these various research approaches allows for a novel construal of the extents and
limits of early goal attribution – one in which the importance of the entire action context
is considered – and points to specific future research directions.
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INTRODUCTION
For 20 years, we have known that infants are able to encode the object-directed actions of others in
terms of their goals (e.g., Gergely et al., 1995; Meltzoﬀ, 1995; Woodward, 1998). In the intervening
years, a great deal of thought and experimental eﬀort has gone into untangling exactly how it
is that infants produce these goal attributions. Indeed, the ability to attribute goals to others –
a component of social learning, prosocial behavior, and communication, with consequences
throughout the lifespan – has been of interest to researchers in other ﬁelds as well who, in turn,
bring their own theoretical backgrounds and techniques. The cross-disciplinary interest is in
part due to the complexity of seemingly simple actions. For example, consider an infant who
is witnessing an adult reach toward an apple. In addition to gathering evidence that the infant
construes the action as being goal-directed, researchers might be interested in how that action is
represented at a cellular level in the infant’s brain, how the infant garners information from the
shape of the experimenter’s hand, or how the features of the apple are represented and maintained
in the infant’s memory. These are all interesting and valuable approaches to our understanding
of object-directed actions, but there have been limited attempts to synthesize the contributions of
diﬀerent ﬁelds.
At best, a fragmented view of the research ﬁndings is limiting: to the observing infant, the topics
of these separate lines of research all represent viable streams of complementary information. At
worst, this fragmentation can lead to poorly controlled experiments as researchers may not be well
versed in the theoretical and methodological insights from other related areas. Indeed, as these
approaches all represent rich and active ﬁelds of study, maintaining a current understanding of
these issues is a daunting task. However, infants obtain and implement their ability to represent
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 February 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 111
Robson and Kuhlmeier Infants’ Understanding of Object-Directed Action
the goals of others in a world that is complex and uncontrolled,
and so piecing together how these streams of information interact
together is crucial to forming a true understanding of infant goal
attribution.
The aim of the following review is to synthesize the work from
the last 20 years (approximately) that is explicitly related to infant
goal attribution with research from the neuroscientiﬁc study of
human and non-human animals and object cognition. To do so,
we have organized the review into ﬁve broad (and subdivided)
categories of inﬂuence that together constitute the action context:
the experience and brain maturation of the infant observing the
goal-directed action, the agent who is enacting the goal-directed
action, the components of the action taken to achieve the goal,
the nature of the goal-object itself, and the environment in which
the goal-directed action occurs (Figure 1).
Before starting, however, it is important to present a few
caveats. By ‘goal attribution,’ we speciﬁcally refer to a process
by which an infant forms either an expectation or a prediction
regarding the target and nature of another’s ongoing or future
action. Though ‘goal attribution’ in this sense could be applied
to a number of types of events, in the following paper it refers
almost exclusively to an object-directed1 reaching action. Second,
categorizing aspects of the action context is not meant to imply
orthogonality between them. As will be clear throughout the
review, there is substantial overlap between these categories.
1In most cases in this review, an object is a discrete and visually distinct artifact of
a size easily graspable by an experimenter, such as a teddy bear or a ball, as this is
typical of what is presented in the majority of the experiments discussed. However,
it is useful to recognize that the category ‘object’ is exceptionally broad and could
potentially encompass nearly any physical feature of the infant’s environment,
including the bodies of agents or that of the infant themselves.
Finally, we are not proposing that that this organization reﬂects
any sort of functional model of infant goal attribution, nor
do we suggest that the categories of inﬂuence on infant goal
attribution are necessarily processed simultaneously or even in
every circumstance. Rather, we have synthesized a wide variety
of studies on a wide range of inﬂuences on infants’ attribution
of goals and present them without attempting to make strong
claims as to the relative importance of each type of inﬂuence.
In part, this is due to a lack of the empirical evidence necessary
to do so. However, the primary goal in using this organizational
framework is to show the potential sources of information
vying for infants’ attention in a way that draws attention to the
importance of the entire context in which goal-directed action
occurs.
THE OBSERVER
In the action context discussed in this paper, the observer is
an infant who is watching an agent perform a goal-directed
action. In a seminal study, Woodward (1998) demonstrated that
infants at 9-months of age are sensitive to the goals of others.
In a procedure that has since become widely utilized, 6- and
9-month-old infants ﬁrst watched as a hand moved out onto
a table containing two objects. The hand would approach and
grasp one object from the pair, and would remain in this position
until the end of the trial. This action was repeated upon the
same object until the infants habituated (i.e., their looking time
to the event decreased to a predetermined criterion). At this
point, the locations of the objects were switched, and the hand
reached either toward the same object in a new location or
FIGURE 1 | Description of the elements of an object-directed reach that can influence infants encoding of the goal of that reach. The following paper
will discuss each of the categories listed above and expand upon how the listed factors influence infant’s judgements.
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the previously untouched object in the previously reached for
location. Infants dishabituated (increased looking behavior) to
the latter, indicating that they encoded the original reach as
directed to a particular object. It has subsequently been shown
that infants make predictions, as measured by eye gaze, regarding
which object will be reached for within this paradigm (Cannon
and Woodward, 2012).
Woodward’s experimental procedure has been remarkably
fruitful and has revealedmuch about how infants view the actions
of others. For instance, some researchers, performing variations
on Woodward’s (1998) classic experiment have shown that even
younger infants attribute goals to others (e.g., 5 months, Luo
and Baillargeon, 2005). Tests with younger infants have found
more mixed results (Sommerville et al., 2005; Luo, 2011). This
change in behavior over time, which appears to center on about
5 months of age, suggests a likely role for both experience and
brain maturation. In this way, age is one characteristic of the
observer that inﬂuences the way they perceive the actions of
others.
Self-Production of the Observed Action
Several studies from Sommerville et al. (2005) have emphasized
the role of action experience in the development of goal
attribution. Sommerville et al. (2005) placed Velcro mittens
on the hands of 3-month-old infants and gave them time to
interact with Velcro objects in their vicinity. Typically, infants
begin to reach for objects in their vicinity sometime between
3- and 5-months of age, so the infants in this study were old
enough to extend their hands and contact the objects, but not
yet coordinated enough to have much ﬁrst-hand experience
with reaching and grasping prior to their session with the
‘sticky mittens’ (von Hofsten, 1991; Thelen et al., 1993; Berthier
and Keen, 2006). When these infants took part in a version
of Woodward’s (1998) experiment featuring an experimenter
wearing the same gloves, they expected the actor to act
consistently following the switch in target object locations, while
inexperienced infants showed no expectations. In particular, the
role of ﬁrst-person experience seems to be particularly important,
as infants who have simply observed others using the Velcro
mittens show no expectation for consistent goal-related action
(Woodward, 2009).
Further, there is a relation between the ability to produce
an action and to predict the goal of an action (Falck-Ytter
et al., 2006). In this study, infants watched a video in which
an experimenter reached toward objects on a stage and lifted
them across the stage and into a container. Adults and 12-
month-olds both showed predictive gaze toward the target.
Six-month-olds, however, lacking the ability to perform such
an action themselves, did not exhibit anticipatory gaze toward
the target. Kanakogi and Itakura (2011) similarly demonstrated
a relation between object-directed action prediction and the
ability to produce object-directed reaches by examining infant
eye movements. Four-month-old infants, who lacked the ability
to perform grasping actions, did not make anticipatory gazes,
but 6-, 8-, and 10- month-old infants, did gaze toward the
target of the reach before the arrival of the experimenter’s
hand.
More recently, infants’ ability to predict the goal of
speciﬁc types of object-directed reaching actions were measured
alongside their ability to perform the grasping actions themselves
(Ambrosini et al., 2013). Six-, 8-, and 10-month-old infants
watched a video in which a small ball and a large ball were present
on a table. The infants watched as an experimenter made reaches
toward the objects with either a closed ﬁst, a hand shaped for a
whole-hand grasp, or a hand shaped for a precision pincer grip.
Infants are able to make whole-hand grasps at all three of these
ages, but the pincer grasp typically develops around 8-months of
age or later. While the experimenter made reaches to both the
large and small balls with the closed ﬁst action, the other reaches
went to the appropriate target for their reach type (whole hand to
large ball, pincer to small ball). All infants showed an advantage
in goal anticipation toward the whole hand grasp compared to
the ﬁst-to-large ball reach. However, predictive advantage for
precision grasping was only present and 8- and 10-month old
infants, and was greater in the 10-month olds, consistent their
increased experience with this action over the younger infants.
Relatedly, 10-month-old infants who received direct experience
with using a cane to reach a toy were later sensitive to the goal of
a cane-using actor, yet infants who had observed another person
training, or who had received no training, were not (Sommerville
et al., 2008).
In addition to experience, the infant’s own engagement also
seems to play a role in their growing understanding of others
actions. Infants are not passive observers of other’s actions,
though often positioned that way in experimental settings, and
some researchers have made a case that infant participatory role
in others actions is more crucial than it is typically given credit
for (Reddy and Uithol, 2015). Moll et al. (2007) demonstrated
that 14-month-old infants had stronger recognition of the goal
of an agent if they had engaged directly with an experimenter
as opposed to watching that experimenter have an interaction
with another person. Others have shown that mother-infant
interaction style can have an inﬂuence on the age at which infants
are able to demonstrate goal attribution (Hohenberger et al.,
2012; Licata et al., 2014). The infant’s own part in inﬂuencing
the goal directed actions of others is clearest when considering
that in the early months of life (and to a lesser extent into the
toddler years) the goal-directed actions most frequently observed
by an infant will feature the infant themselves as the target of
that action (picking up, feeding, diaper change, dressing, etc.).
Indeed, infants make postural adjustments in anticipation of
infant-as-object action from their mother as early as 2-months
of age (Reddy et al., 2013). A stronger understanding of how
infants level of engagement with others interacts with their own
ability to produce actions will likely prove crucial to a complete
picture of how goal attribution inﬂuences infants’ behavior in
their day-to-day lives.
Though infants’ own production of action does seem to be
important to their interpretation of others’ behavior, its precise
role remains unclear. Infants also attribute goals to non-human
agents (Shimizu and Johnson, 2004; Luo and Baillargeon, 2005;
Johnson et al., 2007), to novel tool-use actions (Hernik and
Csibra, 2015), and to actions that are biomechanically impossible
(Southgate et al., 2008), situations with which infants could
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not possibly have ﬁrst person action experience. In turn, as
will be seen in section “Mirror Neuron Development,” the
attribution of goals to animated, non-human agents has also
called into question the dominant mirror neuron theory of action
comprehension (e.g., Hamilton and Ramsey, 2013).
Mirror Neuron Development
Another aspect of the observer that inﬂuences their perception
of others’ actions is their brain development. Imaging studies of
the infant brain are notoriously diﬃcult, though it has become
more and more common in recent years. A good deal of the work
relating brain measures to infants perception of action has been
focused on the topic of mirror neurons and action mirroring, so
we will provide here an overview of this topic before moving on
to examples more speciﬁc to the topic of this review.
Mirror neurons are visuomotor neurons that discharge both
when an individual performs a particular action and when
that individual observes another performing a similar action
(Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). Since their discovery, mirror
neurons have been posited as a mechanism by which we might
understand the motor activities of others (e.g., Gallese et al., 1996;
Rizzolatti et al., 1996). These neurons were ﬁrst discovered in the
ventral premotor cortex, area F5, of macaque monkeys (Macaca
nemestrina) and were demonstrated to be active both during the
production of an action and while witnessing another performing
that action (di Pellegrino et al., 1992). The ﬁrst evidence that
this class of neuron exists in humans emerged almost 20 years
ago, but their existence remained controversial until recently,
when the mirror activity was directly observed in neurons in
the brains of surgical patients (Fadiga et al., 1995; Mukamel
et al., 2010). More commonly, mirror activity is observed via
electroencephalography (EEG) in the desynchronization of the
mu rhythm, which occurs during the production and observation
of action and which has been observed in both infants and
adults (Cochin et al., 1998, 1999; Rizzolatti and Craighero,
2004; Nyström, 2008). A recent meta-analysis of fMRI studies
with human participants found persistent evidence for ‘classical’
mirror neuron activity in inferior frontal gyrus, ventral premotor
cortex, and IPL, as well as in less expected areas such as
primary visual cortex and cerebellum (Molenberghs et al., 2012).
Mukamel et al. (2010) observed mirroring in SMA, as well as
in more unusual areas, such as hippocampus, entorhinal cortex,
and parahippocampal gyrus, which has led to the suggestion that
mirror neurons may represent a widely distributed minority of
neurons (Keysers and Gazzola, 2010).
Since the activity of mirror neurons was ﬁrst observed,
they have been posited as a potential mechanism for the
understanding of action. The direct matching hypothesis posits
that observed actions activate a resonance mechanism that
directly maps the observed action onto one’s own internal motor
representation of that motor action, and thus mirror neurons
allow us to understand others’ actions through a simulation
of their acts (Rizzolatti et al., 1996; Iacoboni et al., 1999).
In one study with adults, it was shown that Transcranial
Magnetic Stimulation of the hand motor area, but not of the
leg area, produced deﬁcits in predictive saccades while watching
a reaching hand (Elsner et al., 2013). It has been proposed
by proponents of this theory that mirror neurons represent an
evolutionarily selected innate endowment (Rizzolatti et al., 1996;
Gallese et al., 2007); indeed, some studies have provided support
for this through the use of EEG with rhesus macaque neonates
during observation and production of facial movements (Ferrari
et al., 2012).
This direct matching hypothesis has been criticized recently,
for a variety of reasons. For example, mimed actions (a grasp
without a target) do not activate mirror neurons, yet if mirror
neurons were simulating acts to determine their goal, then the
mirror neurons would have to activate in order to determine
that there was no goal to a mimed act (Csibra, 2005). Similarly,
a number of studies have shown mirror neuron activation in
response to the actions of members of a diﬀerent species (Buccino
et al., 2004), computer animated agents (Hamilton and Ramsey,
2013), or by a robotic claw (Gazzola et al., 2007). Additionally,
studies of people with apraxia have shown a dissociation between
the ability to produce and recognize actions (Negri et al., 2007;
Hickok, 2009).
More recent theories regarding the role of mirror neurons
in goal understanding have made attempts to incorporate the
response to actions that could not be represented in the
motor system. One suggestion is that there is a secondary
mechanism to motor mirroring, a ‘mentalizing network,’ that
attempts to represent the actions of others in terms of their
underlying intentions (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2010). Under
this formulation, the mirror system recognizes a reach to a cup
as serving the goal of drinking water, while the mentalizing
system could represent the reasoning underlying that action (e.g.,
to alleviate thirst or to rinse a bad taste from one’s mouth).
Others have suggested that there are neurons within the motor
system that are activated in response to the goals of produced
and perceived motor acts (Gazzola et al., 2007). By this account,
observers are directly matching the goals of others to their own
goal representations, rather than matching the kinematics of
an action to one’s own representation of that action. Support
for this interpretation includes the ﬁnding that monkey mirror
neurons in F5 will discharge to the closing of a set of pliers on a
goal, even pliers requiring diﬀerent hand movements to operate
(Umiltà et al., 2008). Additionally, there may be experiential
eﬀects on mirror neurons, as these eﬀects can only be observed
after the monkeys have had extensive experience with the tools
(Ferrari et al., 2005; Umiltà et al., 2008; Rochat et al., 2010; Cook,
2012). Indeed, there is evidence from human infants that suggests
that ﬁrst-person experience with observed actions inﬂuences
motor cortex activation in response to observed actions in a way
not observed following strictly observational experience with an
action (van Elk et al., 2008; Gerson et al., 2015; Cannon et al.,
2016).
These theories describe mirror neurons as an innate
evolutionary endowment, the development or dysfunction of
which during infancy has been suggested to be related to a
number of phenomena beyond action understanding, including
neonatal imitation (Rizzolatti et al., 2001), autism spectrum
disorder (Williams et al., 2001), and language development
(Rizzolatti and Arbib, 1998). However, it has also been suggested
by Heyes (2010) that mirror neurons are not innate, but are
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instead tuned through the correlated sensorimotor experiences
of observing and executing the same actions. This associative
hypothesis reduces the role of mirror neurons in action
understanding compared to the direct matching hypothesis,
supposing rather that mirror neurons make up one component
of many that are used to a variety of social-cognitive functions.
It is suggested that mirror neurons do not ‘do’ any speciﬁc
thing, but that their function is determined on an individual level
based on the sensorimotor experience of that individual (Heyes,
2013). Cook (2012) proposes that associative processes are more
compatible with the activation of mirror neurons in response
to learned acts, such as tool use, dance, and in association
with sensory stimuli. However, while the associative hypothesis
does provide room for developmental and learning processes,
it also does not provide a speciﬁc account of what it is that
this population of neurons contributes to the production or
understanding of actions.
From the research with infants that does exist to date, a model
is proposed in which goals are initially identiﬁed outside the
motor system through the presence in the action of various cues
to goal-direction, but once they have been identiﬁed, the motor
system is recruited for predictive motor simulation (Southgate,
2013). This simulation does not need to precisely match the
observed action, but rather is an emulative simulation of how
the goal might be achieved. Southgate supports this view with
evidence that infants show motor activation to actions for which
the infants could not have a corresponding motor representation
(Southgate and Begus, 2013). In this sense, experience matters in
that it provides a template for the prediction, but the experience
does not necessarily have to match the observed action.
Summary and Outstanding Questions
There is evidence that infants’ own experience with the
production of object-directed actions has an inﬂuence on their
ability to understand and predict the ongoing actions of another.
However, the attribution of goals in situations in which infants
could not possibly have had experience suggests that action
production is not entirely required for goal attribution, or that
some experiences can be extrapolated into an understanding of
otherwise seemingly impossible situations. There must also be a
mechanism for the programming or reprogramming of mirror
neurons through motor experience, and there is some evidence
to suggest that this may relate to ﬁrst-hand experience rather
than observation (Gerson et al., 2015; Cannon et al., 2016). The
evidence for the importance of experience is compatible both
with the converging data suggesting that action mirroring in the
motor cortex is in some way involved in goal attribution and the
more recent suggestion that mirror neurons may be sensitive to
goals rather than to particular actions.
Given the lack of concrete evidence for the existence of
this population of neurons in the brains of human infants,
it is unclear whether researchers are observing true mirroring
(neurons ﬁring in response to the same action, both when
produced and observed) simply motor activation in response
to object-directed actions (some neurons ﬁring in relation to
produced actions, adjacent neurons responding to observed
actions). However, providing a deﬁnitive answer to this question
will require great technological advancements to achieve the
required spatial resolution in a non-invasive fashion. Here, our
aim is not to argue against the existence of mirror neurons in
human infants, but merely to call for caution in the interpretation
of less direct measures of neural activity, especially in studies
where neural activity during action production is not measured.
THE AGENT
Infants understand object-directed events to be attributes of
the actor (the ‘agent’); goals are not generalized from one
individual to another (Buresh and Woodward, 2007; Henderson
and Woodward, 2012). In this section, we present ﬁndings that
suggest that the agent who performs the object-directed action
provides a number of signals to the observing infant, including
their animacy, their history of actions, and their broader bodily
movements. In section “The Object Approach,” we will discuss
the signals presented by the more ﬁne-detailed mechanics of the
agent’s goal-directed action.
Animacy
Infants appear to limit goal attributions to animate and
animated entities, suggesting that distinguishing the animate
from inanimate is an important component of this ability. The
exact properties of entities that result in the percept of animacy
for adults and infants are the topic of a rich body of research (for
a review, see Rutherford and Kuhlmeier, 2013) with foundations
in the work of Heider and Simmel (1944) and Bassili (1976).
Here, we emphasize research that speciﬁcally pertains to infants’
recognition of action that is directed to goal objects during the
ﬁrst 2 years of life.
Early, seminal research alluded to the special status of animate
(in this case, human) motion to infant goal attribution; in
Woodward (1998), infants increased visual attention to a rigid
stick moving in a new path of motion rather than to a new
goal object, and 18-month-olds in Meltzoﬀ (1995) re-enacted
the goal-directed behavior of a human actor but not a machine.
Subsequent work has demonstrated that infants encode the
actions of agents as directed to particular goal objects if there
is evidence that the agent is self-propelled or, relatedly, can
change direction (Luo and Baillargeon, 2005; Luo and Johnson,
2009), that the agent can interact contingently with other agents
(Shimizu and Johnson, 2004; Johnson et al., 2007), and that
the agent is capable of biological motion (Yoon and Johnson,
2009). In these studies, the goal-directed actions are limited to
approaching or gazing at objects, owing to the limited physical
aﬀordances of the animated agents. As will be seen in section
“Hand Conformation,” however, infants appear to consider
more ﬁne-grained physical aﬀordances when agents with more
articulated appendages (e.g., hands) are depicted.
History of Goal-Directed Actions
Many studies of infant goal attribution use a procedure in
which the infant observes an agent repeatedly performing a goal
directed action before an alteration is made to the scene, at which
point the infant’s recovery of interest in the scene is measured
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by looking time. The amount of exposure diﬀers between
studies: some use infant-determined habituation paradigms (e.g.,
those that closely follow Woodward, 1998) while others use
familiarization paradigms in which exposure is predetermined
by the experimenter (e.g., Luo and Baillargeon, 2005; Hernik and
Southgate, 2012). Yet, the fact remains that in these studies, one
of the primary pieces of information available to infants regarding
what the agent will do in test trials is what the agent has done
in the past. Indeed, in more recent studies measuring eye-gaze
during the observation of action, infants predict the target of an
action, but must see the completed action at least once before
doing so (Henrichs et al., 2012; Brandone et al., 2014).
Infants also appear to consider an actor’s new goal directed
action in relation to previous action in a diﬀerent setting.
By at least 9 months, infants discriminate between approach
behavior to two diﬀerent characters based on the agent’s previous
interactions with the characters in another environment (i.e.,
helping or hindering, Kuhlmeier et al., 2003; Hamlin et al., 2007;
Kuhlmeier, 2013). Relatedly, at the same age, infants who have
observed an agent repeatedly manipulate an object in a certain
manner (e.g., slide it) look longer if she selects an object that,
due to a change in the physical setting, cannot be manipulated in
the same way (Song and Baillargeon, 2007). These results suggest
that infants are considering not only what an agent is doing in
the present, but also what an agent has done in the past. Future
studies might consider how others’ past inconsistencies inﬂuence
infants’ later expectations and predictions.
Broader Bodily Movements
The agent’s bodily motion, beyond the movement of a reaching
arm and hand (see The Object Approach), also appears to be
an informative signal relevant to infant goal attribution. Head
direction and eye gaze, like a reach, appears to be construed as
object directed. Four-month old infants who saw an actor gaze at
one of two objects reliably looked less at the object that had been
the target of the actor’s gaze, even in the absence of the actor,
suggesting that the infants found the object that had not been
cued by the actor’s gaze to bemore novel (Reid and Striano, 2005).
More relevant to the topic of this paper, by at least 12 months of
age, infants who were habituated to an event in which an agent
gazes toward and smiled at one of two objects later looked longer
at events in which the agent held the object that they had not
previously gazed toward (Phillips et al., 2002). Thus, eye-gaze
appears to be interpreted as object directed and may provide
information to infants as to an agent’s subsequent object-directed
reaches.
Further examples of infants’ use of movement in their
interpretation of goal directed action come from infant-directed
action, the ‘motionese’ described by Brand et al. (2002). In
this study, mothers were asked to demonstrate the properties
of ﬁve novel objects to either an adult partner or to their
own infants. Compared to their interactions with the adults,
the mothers’ demonstrations to their infants occurred in closer
proximity to the infants, with greater enthusiasm and repetition,
and exaggerated but simpler movements. This ﬁnding has been
expanded upon by others who have demonstrated that parents’
engagement in ‘motionese’ in object-directed actions witnessed
by their infants both increases the attention paid by infants to the
action and inﬂuences the infant’s own later exploration of that
object (Brand and Shallcross, 2008; Koterba and Iverson, 2009).
Thus, it is possible that outside of laboratory examples of simple
object directed reaches, in which ‘motionese’ is typically limited,
infants may regularly use these movements in their interpretation
of others’ object directed actions.
Summary and Outstanding Questions
The agent performing an action represents a particularly
rich source of information to infants. Infants are capable of
interpreting information from the agent’s gaze, from their history
with that agent, and from cues that the agent may be providing
speciﬁcally in an attempt to enhance communication. However,
a number of questions remain about what infants take away
from this type of information. For instance, while we know that
infants use historical information about agents to shape their
expectations for those agents, it is unclear exactly how long
lasting this inﬂuence is, or how durable to changes in the broader
environment. Sommerville and Crane (2009), for example, found
that 10-month-old infants’ goal attributions may not extend
across a change in the room in which the action is occurring. In
most goal attribution studies, repeated action is followed closely
in time by a test, but it is unclear how readily this translates to
infant’s viewing of everyday action.
THE OBJECT APPROACH
The way that a goal object is approached is also a source of
information for infants attending to the action. Indeed, these
actions are typically as direct as possible while also being ‘honest’
in that in order to act upon an object, one must necessarily bring
themselves into contact with that object in a manner that aﬀords
the particular action.
Direction of Movement
A feature of goal attribution studies that is not often discussed
is that the completion of the object directed goal is typically
witnessed by the infant viewing the reaching. It is thus interesting
to consider how infants respond when a portion of their viewing
of an action is disrupted. Daum et al. (2008) presented 6- and
9-month-old infants with a video of an experimenter beginning
a reach toward one of two objects on a stage, from both the
point of view of the experimenter and that of an onlooker.
When the experimenter’s hand passed between the midpoint
between their starting position and the target object, the video
stopped and the infants were simultaneously presented with still
frames of completed reaches: a plausible outcome depicting the
experimenter holding the object that was on reach trajectory,
and an implausible outcome in which the other object was
grasped. Infants looked longer toward the displays presenting
the implausible outcomes, suggesting that they had formed an
expectation as to the target of the reach from the direction of the
arm during the initiation of the reach.
Repeated actions that approach the same object but from
diﬀerent starting locations also appear to indicate to infants
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that, in general, the actions are goal-directed. Evidence for the
inﬂuence of this ‘equiﬁnal variation’ comes from studies in which
infants observe an agent who does not grasp an object, but
approaches it through variable routes. In a variation on the
Woodward (1998) design, for example, Biro and Leslie (2007)
found that 6-, 9-, and 12-month-old infants looked longer
when a new object was approached after previously observing
a hand or paper tube repeatedly poke a diﬀerent object from
multiple directions. In later studies, both 3-month-old (Luo,
2011) and 6.5-month-old infants (Csibra, 2008) appeared to view
the actions of an unfamiliar, non-human agent as directed to a
goal object if the agent approached the target object eﬃciently
and with variation in target approach.
Hand Conformation
At some point during the ﬁrst year of life, infants begin to
consider the appropriateness of the conformation of an agent’s
hand to the action they are taking. For example, 9-month-
olds who observed repeated, non-functional but object-directed
action (an approach with the back of a hand) did not respond
to changes in the target object as they do with grasping actions
(Woodward, 1999). Similar results have been found in other
studies, in which infants made anticipatory gazes toward the
target of a grasping reach, but not toward the target of a back-
of-hand reach (Kanakogi and Itakura, 2011; Krogh-Jespersen and
Woodward, 2014). Additionally, infants are less likely to choose
the same target as an experimenter when that experimenter has
used a back of hand action (Hamlin et al., 2008). Neuroscience
techniques have found converging results. Using EEG, Southgate
et al. (2010) found that 9-month-old infants did not show motor
activation in response to the viewing of a back of the hand
action.
Infants also use hand conformation to form expectations
about the action that will be performed. Six-month-old infants
who were able to produce a pincer grip looked longer when
a pincer grasp or a palmar grasp were used on apertures
inappropriately sized for those grasps, while infants lacking
a pincer grip showed no expectations (Daum et al., 2011).
Relatedly, Gredebäck et al. (2009) performed a study in which
infants viewed an experimenter either reach for objects and move
them across a stage or move a closed ﬁst to each object and then
the opposite side of the stage, mimicking the arm movement in
the other condition. At 14-months, but not 10-months, infants
made predictive gazes to the targets of reaches, but their gaze
followed the closed ﬁst reactively. Similarly, as noted in section
“Self-Production of the Observed Action,” the pre-shaping of the
hand to the size of the target plays a signiﬁcant role in infants’
ability to predict the target of a reach, depending on their ability
to produce that grip themselves (Ambrosini et al., 2013).
Efficiency to Environmental Constraints
An additional cue comes in the form of the path taken by the
agent toward their goal object. This information has a prominent
role in one of the most cited models of infant goal attribution
(‘the teleological stance,’ Gergely et al., 1995; Csibra and Gergely,
2007). The model posits that the end state of an action may
(or may not be) seen as the goal of the action depending on
whether the action culminating in that end state is deemed to
be eﬃcient in relation to the current environmental constraints.
To use a concrete example, by at least 9-months of age, infants
consider the goal of an animated ball to be ‘to approach the other
ball’ when its means (jumping over a barrier) of getting to this
end state is rational given the situational constraints (a barrier
is between the balls; Gergely et al., 1995). Similarly, Southgate
et al. (2008) found that 6- to 8-month-old infants looked longer
at a less eﬃcient motion path (e.g., unnecessarily moving other
objects before reaching for a goal object) than a biomechanically
impossible motion path (e.g., ‘snaking’ around an obstructing
object before reaching for a goal object), suggesting that these
infants had a stronger expectation for eﬃciency of action than for
possibility of action. Subsequent research using procedures based
on Woodward (1998) and eye-tracking of predictive gaze have
further suggested that ineﬃcient action may actually prevent 7-
to 12-month-old infants from encoding an action as goal-directed
(e.g., Biro et al., 2011; Hernik and Southgate, 2012; Verschoor and
Biro, 2012; Biro, 2013).
The empirical focus on the role of action eﬃciency in
infant goal attribution has also led to a critical reappraisal of
how we measure whether an infant construes an action as
being goal directed. Take, for example, infants’ observation of
a reach for an object sitting alone on a table (or in the case
of computer-animated agents, an approach toward an object).
After habituation or familiarization to this event, infants do not
discriminate between reaches for this same object and reaches
for a new object that has been added to the table. This null
result has been found across many studies and laboratories (Luo
and Baillargeon, 2005; Biro et al., 2011; Luo, 2011; Hernik and
Southgate, 2012). Some have interpreted these results to suggest
that infants do not see reaches toward singly presented objects
as being goal-directed because there is no evidence for eﬃciency
of action. Indeed, in conditions in which an agent eﬃciently
circumvents a barrier to get to the object, infants then appear to
discriminate between the agent’s actions on the old object versus
a newly presented object (e.g., Hernik and Southgate, 2012).
Yet, as noted by Kuhlmeier and Robson (2012), it is hard to
consider a simple reach toward a single object in the absence
of obstacles as anything other than goal-directed and eﬃcient.
While it has not been deﬁnitively demonstrated that the mirror
neuron system is a mechanism for goal attribution in humans, it
should be noted that mirror neurons were initially discovered in
rhesus macaques because of activation in response to a simple,
unimpeded reach toward a single object (di Pellegrino et al.,
1992). Indeed, current work on human infants also suggests
motor activation in response to the viewing of simple reaches
(Nyström, 2008; Southgate et al., 2009).
Instead, it is possible that eﬃciency of action is particularly
important on tasks in which infants must encode the features of a
goal object, as is required on tasks in which test trials examine
a looking time diﬀerence between reaches that continue to be
directed to a previous goal object and reaches to a new object
(e.g., similar to Woodward, 1998). In these tasks, infants only
‘pass’ if they have initially encoded the agent’s reach as being
directed toward ‘that object’ as opposed to being directed toward
‘an object’ (Kuhlmeier and Robson, 2012). Thus, it may be too
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early to claim that infants do not attribute goal-directedness to
agents who reach for singly presented objects, though exactly how
the goal object itself is encoded may be limited (see also Object
Properties and Presence of Alternatives).
Summary and Outstanding Questions
From the work reviewed in this section, it is clear that the
movement features of the reaching action are a rich source
of information to infants. How the action occurs with respect
to environmental constraints is a key component to infants’
attribution of goals to others. Biomechanical information, in
terms of hand shape and direction of movement, also plays a
strong role, particularly in the anticipation of action outcomes.
However, a number of questions remain about the processing
of this information. In particular, it is worth considering the
diﬀerence between the functionality of an action and the
intentionality of an action. The extension of an arm to place the
back of one’s hand on an object is clearly an intentional act, but
this action is also treated diﬀerently than other actions with a
more obvious functionality vis-à-vis an object, on both a neural
and behavioral level. Yet, it remains unclear whether infants are
failing to attribute a goal or whether the goal of the action seen
as something other than the object upon which the action is
terminated.
THE GOAL OBJECT
One distinct way in which the object acted upon inﬂuences the
way infants process that action as goal directed is through its
very presence or absence. This factor has been especially studied
in the mirror neuron literature. Rizzolatti and Craighero (2004),
in a discussion of the basic properties of mirror neurons, write
(emphasis added):
“There are two classes of visuomotor neurons in monkey area
F5: canonical neurons, which respond to the presentation
of an object, and mirror neurons, which respond when the
monkey sees object-directed action (Rizzolatti and Luppino,
2001). In order to be triggered by visual stimuli, mirror neurons
require an interaction between a biological eﬀector (hand or
mouth) and an object. The sight of an object alone, of an agent
mimicking an action, or of an individual making intransitive
(non-object-directed) gestures are all ineﬀective.”
In both adult humans and macaque monkeys, mirror
activation has been shown in response to an object-directed
action, but not to viewing the same motion performed in the
absence of an object (di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Gallese et al., 1996;
Umiltà et al., 2001; Muthukumaraswamy et al., 2004). Mirror
response in the absence of an object-directed action has been
observed, but only in a small minority of studies (Calvo-Merino
et al., 2006).
Infants show motor activation in response to an apparently
object-directed action but not in response to mimed grasping
actions (Southgate et al., 2010). In this experiment, 9-month-old
infants were measured with EEG as they watched a demonstrator
either make a reaching grasp or a non-functional back-of-hand
movement, either in the absence of an object or behind an
occluder. Infants exhibited greater motor activation only while
observing reaches behind an occluder. Even though the infants
could not see the object upon which the reaching object
terminated (in this case, one was not actually present), this was
the only condition in which the infants could infer an outcome
with which they have any experience. Indeed, this is not the only
sense in which the availability of the objects matters to infants.
For instance, Scott and Baillargeon (2013) demonstrated that
infants also consider the mental and physical ease with which
objects can be obtained.
Object Properties
Though the presence of an object appears to be an important
factor in infants’ construal of reaching events, by 12-months of
age, infants may not diﬀerentiate between reaches to objects that
are visually diﬀerent but of the same kind. Following a procedure
based on Woodward (1998), Spaepen and Spelke (2007) found
that infants who were habituated to reaches toward one of two
objects (e.g., a doll) dishabituated to reaches to a new object if the
new object was of a diﬀerent type (e.g., a truck) but not to reaches
to a featurally distinct object of the same kind (e.g., another doll).
Follow-up experiments revealed that infants could discriminate
between the novel objects and the old, but that when the two
objects available during habituation were of the same category,
the infants did not look longer toward inconsistent choices within
that pair at test.
From the ﬁrst few months of life, object properties have been
shown to have an inﬂuence on infant looking behavior, in the
absence of any goal directed action, and in diﬀerent ways than
seen in adults (Adams, 1987; Henrichs et al., 2012; Taylor et al.,
2013). Infants’ own experience with certain object properties,
such as weight, also inﬂuences the way infants view objects
and the actions of others upon those objects. For instance, 11-
month-old infants show preferential reaching toward objects
they expect to be lighter (Paulus and Hauf, 2011). Infants
also show diﬀerential mu desynchronization when watching an
experimenter lift an object based on their experience with that
object weight (Marshall et al., 2013a,b).
The aﬀordances of an object, and the infant’s experience with
the use of a particular object, also inﬂuence infants’ expectations
for action on that object For instance, one study found that 12-
month-old infants, after watching an experimenter reach for and
grasp one of two objects, demonstrated stronger motor cortex
activation in response to ‘extraordinary’ events (e.g., phone to
mouth, cup to ear) than to ‘ordinary events’ (phone to ear, cup
to mouth; Stapel et al., 2010). This result was interpreted as
demonstrating increased goal-related planning from the infants
as they re-evaluated the unusual action during its execution. In
a similar paradigm, Hunnius and Bekkering (2010) examined
the anticipatory gaze of infants at a number of ages (6-, 8-, 12-,
14-, and 16-months) and found that infants were more likely to
make anticipatory gazes toward the functional target than the
non-functional. In another study, it was determined that infants
20-month-old infants, but not 14-month-olds, can predict the
intended use of a multi-purpose tool based on the way it is
grasped initially (Paulus et al., 2011).
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Taken together, these studies suggest certain object properties
are more likely to attract infant gaze, inﬂuence infants own
predilections toward acting upon those objects, and inﬂuence the
expectations infants have for others’ actions upon those objects.
Moreover, infants bring their own experiences with objects to
the experiment with them, which can impact the expectations
infants have for the actions taken upon those objects. The way
that experience with objects inﬂuences infants’ expectations for
others actions upon those objects is ripe for study (e.g., whether
the onset of eating solid food narrows expectations for the types
of things that an experimenter might bring to their mouth).
Occlusion
Though infants are able to process the features of goal objects
while they are within view, they have diﬃculty binding these
features to their representation of the object while it is out of view.
Yet, a key component of the goal attribution studies discussed
thus far is that the objects are typically out of the infant’s sight
for some amount of time during a testing session (e.g., when
a curtain is lowered or when the locations of the objects are
switched2). Thus, in order for an infant to show looking time
diﬀerences for object-directed reaches in a Woodward (1998)
style design, the infants must not only have attributed a goal
to the actor, but also remember the identity of at least one of
the objects that were available to her, even through occlusion.
The following section will outline studies demonstrating infants’
diﬃculty maintaining feature-rich object representations in a way
that is robust to occlusion, followed by a discussion as to how this
research pertains to infant goal attribution studies.
Experiments on infant object understanding often relate to
two concepts, object individuation and object identiﬁcation.
Object individuation refers to the formation of distinct
representations for the object/s in question (“there are two
things”), while object identiﬁcation refers to individuating objects
and binding at least some of the features of that object to
ones representation of that object (“there is a yellow ball and
a pink bear”). Research suggests that infants ﬁrst gain the
ability to individuate objects. These spatiotemporally deﬁned
representations allow the infant to perform operations such as
addition (e.g., 1 object + 1 object = 2 objects: Wynn, 1992),
though the identity of the objects is not represented (e.g., 1
Elmo+ 1 Elmo= 2 Ernies: Simon et al., 1995).
The earliest ages at which infants have been shown to notice
a change in the identity during the presentation of multiple
occluded objects is 6-months, at which point infants can identify
a single object from a pair, and only if the spatiotemporal
distinction is maintained between the objects during occlusion
2A notable exception to this occlusion during the changing of the location of test
objects (the only example of which the authors are aware) is found in Spaepen
and Spelke (2007). In this work, two experiments occurred in which infants
were habituated to a pair of objects of the same category (two distinct trucks
or two distinct dolls), and their locations were switched before test within the
view of the infants. This was done to examine whether the loss of spatiotemporal
information was to blame for infants failure to show looking time diﬀerences
toward inconsistent action upon objects of the same category when the location
switch was occluded. As all three of these experiments presented null results;
however, the conclusions that can be drawn from these results pertaining to the
current discussion are limited.
through the use of separate occluders for each object (Kaldy
and Leslie, 2005; Kibbe and Leslie, 2011). However, even by
12-months of age, infants still have some diﬃculty maintaining
robust, feature-rich representations of objects that have gone out
of sight. For example, after observing a rubber duck and a toy
truck emerge one at a time from opposite sides of an occluder,
12-month-olds (but not 10-month-olds) looked longer when the
occluder dropped to reveal only one object (e.g., the duck). That
is, prior to 12 months of age, infants do not appear to represent
the occluded duck that they just saw as a ‘duck’ but as a featureless
object that can emerge again as a truck (Xu and Carey, 1996).
In a later experiment, the objects used varied either on size,
color, and pattern, with the aim of determining which perceptual
information would be suﬃcient to prompt infants to individuate
multiple objects in the absence of clear spatiotemporal cues. Here,
though, 12-month-old infants did not individuate, succeeding
only when the objects diﬀered in kind (Xu et al., 2004).
Findings such as these are diﬃcult to reconcile with the
results of goal attribution studies, in which 5- and 6-month old
infants (and in some cases, 3-month olds), appear to notice when
two objects have switched location while occluded by a single
occluder. This situation lacks any spatiotemporal evidence of a
change to the objects, and so infants must have bound some
features to their representations of at least one of these objects in
order to show diﬀerential looking time toward an actor reaching
their prior goal object versus a diﬀerent one. It is possible that
other factors, of the sorts so far discussed in this review, may
be prompting infants in goal attribution studies to form more
robust, feature-bound object representations than infants in tasks
speciﬁcally measuring object identiﬁcation. This proposal will be
addressed again in section “Presence of Alternatives.”
Action Effects
The binding together of an action and the perceived eﬀect of that
action on the world appears to occur from as early as 2-months
of age (Rochat and Striano, 1999; Verschoor et al., 2010). In a
series of experiments, Verschoor et al. (2010, 2013) demonstrated
that infants (ages 7-, 9-, 12-, and 18-months) can bind an action
and its eﬀect in a bi-directional way, and that infants after 12-
months of age are inﬂuenced in their action selection by action
eﬀects. Detecting relationships between actions and their eﬀects
also impacts infants’ understanding of others’ object directed
reaches. In previous sections, we noted that when an infant views
non-functional back-of-hand action toward an object, they show
diﬀerent neural response than to grasping actions and also do
not show changes in looking time when the target of the action
is changed (Woodward, 1999; Southgate et al., 2010). However,
when this back-of-hand action is presented along with a salient
action eﬀect, such as moving the object contacted, infants become
sensitive to later changes in the target of the action (Király et al.,
2003; Biro et al., 2014).
Further evidence for binding between object directed actions
and their eﬀects comes from measures ofmu-desynchronization.
Paulus et al. (2012) demonstrated that 8-month-old infants show
greater mu-desynchronization when presented with the sound
of a special rattle they had been trained to use, compared to
other familiar and unfamiliar sounds. Nine-month-olds, when
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presented with the sounds from a rattle that they have only ever
seen shaken, show increased motor activation, despite having
never produced the action to cause that sound before themselves.
In sum, infants appear to bind novel action eﬀects to their motor
representations of actions already within their motor repertoire
(Paulus et al., 2013).
Summary and Outstanding Questions
In this section, we have presented aspects of the goal object
that appear to be relevant to infants’ understanding of object-
directed action. The mere presence or absence of an object and
whether or not the action upon the object has any perceptible
eﬀect have a strong inﬂuence both on the neural processing of the
object-directed action and, relatedly, upon the infants behavior in
response to the action. The features of the targeted object and its
aﬀordances also inﬂuence infants’ expectations for others actions
upon them.
Of particular interest is how infants’ ability to represent objects
during occlusion is inﬂuenced by goal-directed action upon those
actions. As brief occlusion of objects has been a commonplace
feature of goal attribution studies since Woodward’s (1998)
original study, the discrepancy between the ages at which
infants successfully encode the features objects in goal attribution
studies (5–6-months, 3-months under certain circumstances)
and object cognition studies (12-months, 6-months under
speciﬁc circumstances) is worthy of examination.
THE GOAL ENVIRONMENT
Presence of Alternatives
As noted in section “Eﬃciency to Environmental Constraints,”
after observing an actor reach for an object sitting alone on a
table, infants up to at least 9 months of age do not subsequently
discriminate between reaches to this same object and reaches
for a new object that has been added to the table (e.g., Biro
et al., 2011). By some accounts, infants’ diﬃculty in this task
is due to the fact that though infants can attribute to agents
both goals and preferences for objects, in the case of a reach or
approach behavior directed to a lone object, there is no evidence
regarding the agent’s preference between the original object and
the newly added object. Thus, in contrast with infants tested
with the Woodward (1998) paradigm, infants have no basis for
distinguishing between subsequent reaches to the old object or
to the new one (e.g., Luo and Baillargeon, 2005). By another
account, infants do not distinguish between reaches to the old and
new object because they never encoded the original reach toward
the single object as being goal-directed in the ﬁrst place (Hernik
and Southgate, 2012).
A third possibility, though, is that that infants fail to
demonstrate expectations for action in a single-object condition
because they did not encode the speciﬁc object the agent
interacted with, not because they failed to perceive the action
toward the single object as goal-directed or had no information
regarding the actor’s preferences. As noted earlier, tasks that are
based onWoodward (1998) require infants to encode the features
of objects that are reached for, and it is possible that the presence
of an alternative object might inﬂuence infants’ processing of
the object that is being acted upon. In support of this claim,
9-month-old infants do not rely on the identity of a secondary,
unchosen object as a prompt to encode the feature of an actor’s
target object, but do seem to rely on its mere presence (Robson
and Kuhlmeier, 2013).
Yet, in other situations, the identity of potential alternative
goal objects may be informative for infants in interpreting the
object-directed reaches of others. For example, in one study, 9-
month-old infants were tested in a paradigm involving multiple
object pairings (Robson et al., 2014). Two objects (A and B)
were present on a stage in front of an actor, who would reach
out and choose one of these (A). In the next trial, there were
also two objects on stage; this time the pair contained one
object that had been seen before and one new object (B and
C). Now, the actor reached for the previously ignored object
(B). These trials alternated until infants reached habituation, at
which point infants were shown just one of the pairings (A and
B or B and C) and shown reaches that were either consistent
or inconsistent (e.g., B when A and B were present) with the
actor’s previous goals. Infants looked longer toward inconsistent
actions, suggesting that they must have been encoding not only
the features of the target objects, but also of the alternatives. That
is, a reach for B was inconsistent in the presence of A, but not in
the presence of C. Using a similar method, 16-month-old infants
were shown to demonstrate transitive inference, which again
would rely on encoding the identity of the alternative objects
(Mou et al., 2014). Thus, it is possible that infants may encode
the features of alternatives when doing so is necessary to form
expectations about which actions another might take.
Location of Action
Sommerville and Crane (2009) investigated 10-month-old
infants’ ability to represent goals across locations. They provided
infants with unambiguous information about an actor’s choice
of objects by having the actor select one of two objects from a
spot on the ﬂoor prior to testing. The infants then habituated to
the selection of one object from a pair through means infants
typically ﬁnd ambiguous, either in the same room in which the
pre-test reaching occurred, or in a diﬀerent room. It was found
that infants interpreted the ambiguous action as being about the
target object only when the test was performed in the same room
as the pre-test reaches toward that object. This suggests that, at
10-months of age, infants’ representations of others goalsmay not
be durable to changes in the broader setting.
However, in other studies, changes of scenery have not
disrupted infants’ representations of others’ goals. As noted in
section “History of Goal-Directed Actions,” by 9 months, infants
discriminate between an agent’s approaches to two diﬀerent
characters based on that agent’s previous interactions with the
characters in another environment (i.e., Kuhlmeier et al., 2003;
Hamlin et al., 2007). At the same age, infants who have observed
an agent repeatedly move an object in a certain manner look
longer if she selects an object that, due to a change in the
physical setting, cannot be moved in the same way (Song and
Baillargeon, 2007). A potential explanation for this discrepancy
could be that in experiments where infants attribute goals across
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settings, it is the agent’s location that has changed, while the infant
has remained in the same place. However, further study of the
durability of infants’ attribution of goals to changes in setting is
necessary for making stronger claims about why this occurs in
some cases and not others.
CONCLUSION
In this review we have discussed how context can inﬂuence
the way an infant processes the object-directed actions of
others. We have drawn from research on the mirror neuron
system, object understanding, and infant goal understanding,
compared ﬁndings and methodologies across these disciplines,
and discussed how ﬁndings from each of these domains may
have implications for the others. The primary goals of this review
were to provide a relatively broad, though likely not exhaustive,
review of several research areas and discuss their relevance to the
problem of understanding infant goal attribution. The secondary
aim was to highlight the variety of sources from which infants
can draw information to inform their expectations of others’
object-directed actions. In doing so, we have presented a number
of observations and open questions pertaining to each of these
information sources, but in concluding will attempt to do so on a
broader scale.
One of the most readily apparent directions forward is to
study how these various sources of information available to
infants work together, or how infants prioritize these sources
when they conﬂict. As a result of our striving to perform
controlled experiments, we often create artiﬁcial environments
in which only one of these many factors is variable, when in
fact any of them could potentially matter and almost all of
them will be variable in the real life situations in which infants
actually employ goal attribution as a mechanism for learning.
Broadly speaking, motor system activation, personal experience
and physical ability, and teleological considerations all appear to
contribute greatly toward infants’ understanding of the goals of
others, with none of these appearing to be able to explain this
ability completely in isolation. Comparing ages and achievements
across object cognition and goal attribution literature seems
to point to concurrent changes in these cognitive abilities at
around 5–6 months of age that make goal attribution possible.
Further evidence would be required to make strong claims
regarding simultaneous changes in the mirror neuron system
at 5–6 months. However, as infants are developing their own
reaching capabilities at this age, and given the change in infant
behavior toward others reaches as their own grasping competence
grows (Gredebäck et al., 2009; Daum et al., 2011; Ambrosini et al.,
2013) and the evidence for change in mirror neuron function in
response to experience (Ferrari et al., 2005; Umiltà et al., 2008;
Rochat et al., 2010), such changes seem plausible.
Attributing a goal to someone else is complicated, and there
is a great deal of information available to an infant watching an
object-directed action that can inﬂuence their interpretation of
that goal. It is important consider all of these factors, not only to
form a fuller understanding of this phenomenon, but to inform
our thinking about how the methods we use can constrain how
we conceptualize an ability.
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